Concepts of Democracy and Elitism in American Intellectual History by Lee, Hyung-dae
【특집】
Concepts of Democracy and Elitism in 
American Intellectual History
Hyung-dae Lee
(University of Maryland University College, Asia)
Introduction
It is known that “seeds of Mimosa, Cassia, and some other genera 
have germinated after being kept in a herbarium more than 200 
years.”1) This is one of nature’s wonders. Yet if the seeds of 
Jonathan Edwards’ philosophical thought which had flourished in the 
United States during the 18th century begin to be budded in Korean 
intellectual soil today,2) the germination of his thought is no less 
mysterious than that of seeds in nature. To study intellectual history 
is to examine and understand what Thomas Carlyle called “the sacred 
mystery”3) in the stream of thought, which runs through past and 
1) Victor R. Boswell, “What Seeds Are and Do: An Introduction,” in The 
United States Department of Agriculture, Seeds: The Yearbook of Agriculture 
1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 5.
2) Since the 1990s, many works of Jonathan Edwards, especially his sermons, 
have been studied in Korea and translated into Korean. From the perspective 
of Americ.
3) Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History in 
The Works of Thomas Carlyle, Vol. V. (originally published in 1841, London: 
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present, and in the life of the mind, which bridges the whole and its 
parts in history and society.
This article, through the long stream of American intellectual history, 
examines how American intellectuals, such as Jonathan Edwards, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, William James, John Dewey, and Walter Lippmann, 
have recognized thought and reality and how they have applied their 
views of them to politics and society in which democracy and elitism 
can be seen as two conflicting concepts. Understanding their recognitions 
of thought and reality, this article argues that throughout American 
intellectual history the antithesis of the concept of democracy had 
been not necessarily that of elitism, for the two concepts based on 
both experiential and transcendental approaches, which we shall see 
in Edwards’ spiritual contemplation, indeed, were needed in reaching 
equilibrium between the whole and its parts, which American intellectuals 
had sought as the most desirable state in the relationship of man and 
God, and of the individual and society. In fact, even when they 
stressed the excellence of the whole and the heroism of man, they did 
so considering their relationships of mutual consent between the 
whole and its parts, and among all parts. In this respect, they were 
not elitist thinkers like Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, who 
established a systematic distinction between the elite and the masses 
in society and politics.4) They also believed that their theological and 
philosophical concepts of democracy and elitism can be, and should 
be, reconciled and applied for the full growth of all individuals and 
the entire progress of society. The aim of this article is to criticize a 
Chapman and Hall, 1897), 80.
4) See Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society (4 vols. London, Jonathan Cape, 
1935) and Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939).
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current intellectual ethos which denies reality as well as human subjects 
themselves due to the belief that the processes of historical formation 
have been dominated by elite persons, elite values, and elite culture, 
for their simplicity and extremity in recognizing thought and reality. 
Recalling William James’s statement that “we live in a world of 
realities that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful,”5) this 
article will pursue which of those thoughts count as the true ones in 
our age.
1. The Significance of Thought in Reality
In his book, The Growth of American Thought, originally published 
in 1942, Merle Curti traced how American society had been democratized. 
By democratization, Curti meant “the full growth and power of the 
individual, of every individual.”6) From the perspective of intellectual 
history, American democracy, Curti believed, could be achieved when 
there was no gap between the thinking of intellectuals and of ordinary 
people. Thus, for Curti, the way to the popularization and diffusion 
of knowledge among ordinary people was through the process of 
democratization. This means that intellectuals and ordinary people 
have mutually cooperated and corresponded, in one way or another, 
and been inseparable in the process of social progress. If it is true, 
however, how can we explain current divisions within the American 
intellectual community and the American people? What is the result of 
the growth of American thought? The nature and growth of thought 
must be much more complex and elusive than what Curti had thought.
5) William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking 
(New York: Longmans Green, 1908), 202.
6) Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 
1964), 384.
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“Every thought,” as James pointed out, starts as “part of a personal 
consciousness.”7) Yet if it does not take up its place in history and 
society and is just owned by persons, it can be reduced to the state 
of “absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism.”8) Then “neither contemporaneity, 
nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and content,” James 
asserted, “are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by 
this barrier of belonging to different personal minds.”9) For James 
“the breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches 
in nature.”10) The world James described seems to be much more 
similar to the world we live in (the age of extreme division) than the 
one which Curti optimistically saw. 
Although “thought,” as James put it, “tends to personal form,”11) it 
always appears to be a fixed form as it has been established 
historically and socially. In other words, although it begins and grows 
in history and society, it takes a form of totality in nature. 
Postmodern thinkers, such as Richard Rorty, attack the very totality 
of thought because they see elitism and its dominant power in the 
totality. Postmodernists and Multiculturalists always use as their 
theoretical weapon against mainstream American thought what Rorty 
calls historicism, which means extreme secularism or materialism, and 
try to remove all spiritual forces in the totality of thought. Thus 
rejecting the metaphysical absolutism of the Western philosophical 
tradition, they follow Rorty’s philosophy which tends to be “therapeutic 
7) William James, The Principles of Psychology Vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt 
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rather than constructive,” and “edifying rather than systematic.”12) 
For them, the way things are said becomes more important than the 
possession of truths. They now urge Americans to start “from where 
we are” and to follow “just the way we live now” to achieve human 
solidarity.13)
Even though James also recognized any abstract monism in thought, 
it was its unity taken singly rather than its totality. For him, rather, 
it is in its totality that the parts of a university hang together. In it, 
as he emphasized, “space and time” could be “vehicles of continuity 
by which the world’s parts hang together.”14) Then “thought,” as 
William James pointed out, “is in constant change”15) and its totality 
also is moving; it can be human, progressive, pragmatic, dynamic, 
creative, and democratic. As it is considered as a perpetual movement, 
the reality whose significance can be exposed by thought will not 
remain a fixed form.
Thus, “as far as reality means experienceable reality, both it and 
the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of mutation
－mutation towards a definite goal.”16) In the process, James, unlike 
the postmodern thinkers, believed that what is historical and social 
could be what is dynamic and creative for individuals and society. 
James also believed that to be creative was not to start from a 
vacuum, from nowhere or nothing. For him, the meaning for humankind 
of what was creative was that which made the present better and 
12) Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 6.
13) Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 29.
14) James, Pragmatism, 134.
15) James, The Principles of Psychology, 229.
16) James, Pragmatism, 224-225.
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prepared one to cope with the coming new world through talent and 
capacity, which could be only acted out in terms of experience, 
emanating from and occurring in society. While the postmodern 
thinkers, attempting to remove mind itself from history and society, 
ignore the whole of reality and the autonomous acts of the subject in 
it, American intellectuals like James, above all, believed that, although 
social thought begins in a physical environment, it grows as the 
product of spirit and mind. Thus, for them, completed thought has 
inherently both experiential elements that may beget democratic ideas 
and transcendent elements, which may generate elitist ideas.
Thus, when American intellectuals recognized thought through both 
experiential and transcendental approaches, their concepts of democracy 
and elitism, as appeared in their philosophy and thought, have not 
been in conflict. For this reason, they have not written against 
democracy or elitism in understanding nation, society, and politics. 
Rather, their belief that democracy has been, can be, and should be, 
reconciled with elitism would be one of the characteristics of the 
American intellectual tradition. 
This same American intellectual tradition is found more definitely 
in the thought of Jonathan Edwards who, as the first great theologian 
and philosopher in American intellectual history, tried to reach the 
profound meaning of God as if appeared in reality through both the 
transcendental and experiential approaches. In his sermon, “A Divine 
and Supernatural Light,” Edwards expounded upon reality: “there is 
such a thing, as a spiritual and divine light, immediately imparted to 
the soul by God, of a different nature from any that is obtained by 
natural means.”17) This ‘spiritual and divine light,’ he suggested, is in 
17) Jonathan Edwards, “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” in A Jonathan 
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“a true sense of the divine excellency of the things revealed in the 
Word of God, and a conviction of the truth and reality of them, 
thence arising.”18) As Edwards talked about the divine excellency of 
these things, it seems that its true sense can be attained only by the 
chosen people or the elite who have transcendental capacities. In fact, 
he emphasized that it is “so transcendent and exceedingly different 
from what is in other things.”19) Nevertheless, he also argued that 
“persons, with but an ordinary degree of knowledge, are capable, 
without a long and subtile train of reasoning, to see the divine excellency 
of the things.”20) Indeed, his theological thought, using the scientific 
and philosophical ideas in defense of a religious faith, truly, tended 
to be at once elite and democratic. But there is one thing we should 
consider here. If everyone sees the excellence of things, what should 
its criterion be? His answer to this question was clarified in his The 
Nature of True Virtue. For him “true virtue most essentially consists 
in benevolence to Being in general” and according to him, “it is that 
consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general.”21) He 
tried to see it “with regard to its universal tendency, and as related 
to every thing that it stands in connexion with” for it “does not 
consist in discord and dissent, but in consent and agreement.” For 
him, a man is “some way related to Being in general, and is a part 
of the universal system of existence; and so stands in connexion with 
the whole.”22) 
Edwards Reader, ed., John E. Smith, Harry S. Stout, and Kenneth P. 




21) Jonathan Edwards, “A Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue,” in The 
Works of President Edwards, Vol. Ⅱ. (New York: Leavitt &Allen, 1856), 262.
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2. The Understanding of Thought and Reality by the Whole-Part 
Relation 
Edwards viewed man as a being valued only on a relational meaning 
of the whole and part. The relation of parts and whole, which was at 
the heart of Edwards’ thought and was explored deeply for the first 
time in the United States, has related him to a long tradition in 
American intellectual history, although his analysis of the relation 
was rooted in a theological elucidation of man and God. From such 
inference, Edwards showed that the relationship between thoughts and 
reality also may be understood through that of parts and whole, 
which has long been dealt with in the Western philosophical tradition 
since Plato had treated it in the Parmenides.23) As we consider the 
relationship between God and men, it can be said that the whole is 
revealed only by parts and they have their significances only within 
it.24) Likewise, the whole-part relation may be applied to that of 
thoughts and reality from a philosophical perspective. In the domain 
of philosophy, thought is just one of the tools to reveal reality. As it 
were, thoughts are not to express the entire reality. Hence, just as a 
whole is not the sum of its parts, that of thoughts is not reality as a 
whole. Although reality is exposed only by thoughts or ideas, each 
thought assumes its significance only when it takes up its place in 
reality. Accordingly, a thought rejecting reality is a tree without 
roots. Yet the whole intellectual and cultural ethos of repudiating it 
has been a pervasive phenomenon in the United States. Where did it 
22) Jonathan Edwards, Scientific and Philosophical Writings, ed., Wallance E. 
Anderson (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980), 397.
23) Ibid., 397.
24) See Plato, “Parmenides,” in George Burges, ed., The Works of Plato, Vol. 
Ⅲ (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent Garden, 1848).
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come from? 
What Richard Rorty calls “philosophy without mirrors” means a 
“philosophy without epistemology,” in which the external object of 
nature is conveyed to the inner subject or mind through the agency 
of representations of sense or ideas.25) When Rorty recognizes reality as 
mirrored and mediated by means of representations, for him, all existing 
things we see appear to be false. Thus Rorty's anti-representational attitude 
becomes a theoretical basis for Postmodernists and Multiculturalists who 
are attempting to try to decompose traditional values and morals in 
American society. This same intellectual ethos has, no doubt, deviated 
far from the American intellectual tradition, which emphasized unity 
and harmony of the whole and the parts from the humble and 
reflective acknowledgment of reality. If reality is denied and all spirit 
and mind in history and tradition are eliminated, can all kinds of 
elitism, as postmodern thinkers wish, disappear in human society? 
How is it possible that seeds are budded without the benefits of 
nature and land? Being already in existence, the land has all kinds of 
nutrition for the seeds. Without it, they cannot exist. Indeed, their 
whole lives depend both upon the complex order of nature’s forces 
and adjustment to it. A seed is to nature what an individual is to 
reality. In this respect, as reality is understood through the relation 
of part and whole, it is realized that the stream of mind still runs 
through it from Edwards to the present. 
As one of the pioneering American intellectual historians, Perry 
Miller, trying to examine the meaning of America and Americans’ raison 
d’être through what he called “history of mind,” recognized clearly 
25) Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 357.
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there was a continuity in the American intellectual tradition. For Miller, 
who saw history itself as “part of the life of the mind” and that “the 
mind of man is the basic factor in human history,”26) thought or 
mind was a vehicle of delivering the meaning of reality. Thus, although 
he pointed out that “there can be no doubt that Jonathan Edwards 
would have abhorred from the bottom of his soul every proposition 
Ralph Waldo Emerson blandly put forward in the manifesto of 1836, 
Nature,” he argued that “certain basic continuities persist” between 
Edwards and Emerson.27)
From a secular perspective different from the theological sense of 
reality Edwards showed, Ralph Waldo Emerson, who stood between 
Edwards and James in the development of American intellectual history, 
proposed a dynamic whole whose spirit can be owned by any individual 
in harmony with nature and man. For Emerson, whole or what he 
called nature “is not only the material, but it is also the process and 
the result.”28) Thus, “all the parts” of nature, he emphasized, “incessantly 
work into each other’s hands for the profit of man.” Indeed, man was 
at the center of his thought. The spirit of the whole, he asserted, 
“reforms itself in the mind, and not for barren contemplation, but for 
new creation.”29) All the endless variety of things, as he described, is 
related to the whole, and partakes of the perfection of the whole. Yet 
“the reason why the world lacks unity,” he argued, “is because man 
is disunited with himself.”30) Certainly, his notion of the whole-part 
26) Perry Miller, Errand Into The Wilderness (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1956), ix.
27) Ibid., 184-185.
28) Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Nature,” in Frederic I. Carpenter, ed., Ralph Waldo 
Emerson: Representative Selections, with Introduction, Bibliography, and 
Notes (New York: American Book, 1934), 14.
29) Ibid., 20.
Concepts of Democracy and Elitism in American Intellectual History   125
relation, by focusing on the active roles of parts, was much more 
dynamic than Edwards’. In his lecture, “The American Scholar,” 
Emerson expounded on the parts: “The one thing in the world, of 
value, is the active soul. This every man is entitled to; this every 
man contains within him, although in almost all men obstructed and 
as yet unborn. The soul active sees absolute truth and utters truth, 
or creates. In this action it is genius; not the privilege of here and 
there a favorite, but the sound estate of every man. In its essence it 
is progressive.”31)
The statement Emerson mentioned above shows that the theological 
notion of Edwards regarding the whole-part relation was replaced by 
the exclusively man-centered and metaphysical one. Emerson’s view 
on man, though he mentioned about the special role of genius, appeared 
to be democratic in that he exalted all men.
Nevertheless, Emerson’s thought, no doubt, is based considerably on 
what Edwards called “excellency.” Emerson saw in man the excellent 
aspects Edwards recognized in reality. By exceedingly emphasizing the 
autonomous power of man, however, Emerson didn’t acknowledge what 
Edwards defined excellency as “the consent of being to being, or being’s 
consent to entity.”32) Thus, “the highest Excellency,” for Edwards, “must 
be the consent of Spirits one to another.”33) His notion of consent 
would appear more dynamically in the thought of William James who 
lived in “the huge world” that tested men in all sorts of ways. 
30) Ibid., 48.
31) Emerson, “The American Scholar,” in Ibid., 56.
32) Edwards, Scientific and Philosophical Writings, 336.
33) Ibid., 337.
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3. The Harmony of Parts and the Whole Through Relational Meaning 
of Authority
As we have seen so far, there was no fundamental interruption in 
the stream of American thought which started from Edwards and 
passed through Emerson. Although they appeared to differ in degree 
and emphasis in recognizing the whole and part, their attitudes toward, 
and views of, reality and man continued to be based on the whole-part 
relation. In doing so, their basic concepts of democracy and elitism 
played complementary roles in their philosophy and thought. If so, 
how could the whole-part relation continue to be sustained throughout 
American intellectual history?
Although American thought began in earnest in the mind of Edwards, 
it developed from a heritage of European thought. Then it has become 
unique and creative through cultural interaction and environmental 
selection and modification. Through the long process of accommodation, 
modification, or creation, the parts have been assimilated into a whole, 
and the whole and the parts have thrown light upon one another. 
Thus, a new whole has been formed and is ready to embrace the new 
parts. Thought both creates and is created by the long process of its 
circulation. This dual process of creation is simultaneous. A continuity 
or tradition in the long process of thought becomes authoritative in a 
society or nation.
In the American intellectual tradition, however, authority has been 
understood simply not as the right to perform some action-namely, in 
use of power or coercion--but as a relational concept with a relational 
meaning.34) That is to say, the relational authority includes not only 
34) In examining the relational meaning of authority, this paper focuses on 
the thought of two thinkers. One is Martin Buber, at the center of whose 
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human relationships, but the relation of time-of the past, the present, 
and the future. The whole, in which parts are reconciled and united 
by the relational authority, becomes an internally and dialectically 
dynamic whole, composed of a unity of divergent forces. For example, 
Emerson sought a dynamic, creative equilibrium, in which the whole 
and parts are united by the relational authority. In so doing, he 
always started with the importance of the individual, the firm recognition 
of reality, and the clear understanding of historical continuity connecting 
past, present, and future. Coping with the social, spiritual crises due 
to the challenges of Darwinism, pluralism, and modernism, mainstream 
American intellectuals, such as James, Dewey, and Lippmann, sought 
relational authority in attempting to overcome these challenges. For 
American intellectuals, the whole and parts had to be connected by a 
relational authority, and the resultant whole was to be a dynamic, 
creative equilibrium. 
We cannot conceive of human beings and human society without 
thought is an “I-Thou” relation. For him, “all actual life is encounter.” 
He believed that the present “exists only insofar as presentness, encounter, 
and relation exist.” For him, the existence of men has true meaning only 
when they have a common, immediate relation, both to a living center and 
to one another. Martin Buber, I And Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 62-63. Another thought upon which 
this paper depends in regarding authority as relational is that of Lewis 
Mumford, who sought a dynamic, creative equilibrium within an organic 
society, one necessarily cooperative and integrated. He believed that a 
desirable society, in which men are connected to one another in a 
genuinely organic social life, should keep a balanced or organic relationship, 
not only with its natural environment, but with its material and technological 
apparatus. Lewis Mumford, “The Human Prospect,” in Lewis Mumford, 
Interpretations and Forecasts: 1922-1972 (New York, 1973), 461-473.
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authority. Our ontological meaning and the order of all things are 
found in, and established by, authority. As Leonard Krieger says, 
“authority has been an essential means of controlling our collective 
destinies.”35) Although the history of American social thought started 
from the revolt against authority, its whole process, in a sense, 
appears to have been not to eliminate authority, but to modify and 
keep it. Thus, Walter Lippmann argued that “the Americans were in 
rebellion against the usurpations of George III, not against authority 
as such but against the abuse of authority.”36)
Authority is static and dynamic, and autonomous and compulsory. 
It is a complex historical phenomenon. It is historical, social, political, 
and religious. Therefore, any philosophical theory defining authority 
outside of history, society, politics, and religion is not valid. The true 
authority is founded on the balance of historical, social, political, and 
spiritual elements. From their imbalance, authority comes to be 
authoritarian. In other words, authoritarianism comes from the excesses 
and abuses of a certain part of the elements of authority. When we 
have an imbalance of the elements of authority, we might feel 
authority as the pressures of society. On the other hand, when the 
spiritual content is stripped away from authority, we might feel 
deeply a sense of despair and nihilism.
When the fundamental elements of authority were problematic, 
James began to feel that the harmony of parts and the whole through 
relational meaning of authority would be impossible. For him it was 
the crisis of the relational authority. As a result, the relation of all 
35) Leonard Krieger, “The Idea of Authority in the West,” American Historical 
Review, 82(1972), 249.
36) Walter Lippmann, Essays in The Public Philosophy(Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1955), 67.
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parts and the whole, or even that of parts and parts, wouldn’t be 
maintained in equilibrium. Among other things, some parts would be 
alienated and forgotten before the enormous power of the whole. 
Thus, James, as the intellectual of an era, had to try to perceive 
“the various orders of reality,” because “habitually and practically we 
do not count these disregarded things as existents at all.” As James 
lamented, “they are not even treated as appearances; they are treated 
as if they were mere waste, equivalent to nothing at all” for “to the 
genuinely philosophic mind, however, they,” asserted James, “still 
have existence, though not the same existence, as the real thing.”37) 
Indeed, James’s world of mind may be likened to a vast river, which 
flows across the lives of all Americans in every nook and corner of 
society, to reach, one day, an unknown, wide, and open sea, which 
might be called the sea of equality for all members of society.
At last James’s thought would acknowledge Edwards’ notion of 
excellency, according to which “the more the consent is, and the more 
extensive, the greater is the excellency.” Like Edwards, James also 
believed that “the more perfect Created Spirits are, the nearer do 
they come to their Creator.”38) In other words, that means that the 
entire meaning of the whole can be revealed only by the active and 
definite roles of all parts. As Edwards mentioned, “one alone, without 
any reference to any more, cannot be excellent.”39)
Yet James had to go somewhere beyond Edwards’ road of consent 
because from the world in which he lived he realized that “when a 
dreadful object is presented, or when life as a whole turns up its 
37) James, The Principles of Psychology Vol. II, 287, 291.
38) Edwards, Scientific and Philosophical Writings, 337.
39) Ibid., 337.
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dark abysses to our view, then the worthless ones among us lose 
their hold on the situation altogether, and either escape from its 
difficulties by averting their attention, or if they cannot do that, 
collapse into yielding masses of plaintiveness and fear.” When he 
realized that “the effort required for facing and consenting to such 
objects is beyond their power to make,” what should he have done? 
The answer that came to his mind was to be what Emerson called 
“genius.”40) Like Emerson, he believed that “the heroic mind does 
differently.” For him, it was something to be able to face the sinister 
and dreadful world. He tried to find “in the heroic man” the power to 
maintain the balance of parts and the whole. He tried to “draw new 
life from the heroic mind.”41)
Yet what he pointed to as geniuses or heroes in reality never meant 
a few chosen elites. Even though he seemed to emphasize them as a 
few parts in the whole-part relation, he never devaluated the meaning 
of the whole; neither did he the other parts. Pointing out that “what 
our intellect really aims at is neither variety nor unity taken singly, 
but totality,” he argued that if reality’s diversities “were so irremediable 
as to permit no union whatever of its parts, not even our minds 
could ‘mean’ the whole of it at once.”42) Believing that “the oneness 
and the manyness are absolutely co-ordinate,” he emphasized that 
“neither is primordial or more essential or excellent than the other
.”43)
If so, why did James emphasize the active role of parts instead of 
the harmony of the whole and parts? If James tried to balance powerless 
40) Emerson, “Self Reliance,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Representative Selections, 89.
41) James, The Principles of Psychology Vol. II, 578.
42) James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, 130, 133.
43) Ibid., 138.
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parts against the enormous structure of the whole by emphasizing 
that the heroic mind in parts has something to do with the portraits 
of America during the second half of the nineteenth century, this 
might mean, paradoxically, that his philosophical thought arrived at a 
pessimistic accounting of American society. Or, in a sense, that might 
mean that he wrestled with human problems in the world without the 
absolute.
4. Beyond the Age of Metaphysics
After James, was the age of metaphysics over? If yes, how would 
the relation between whole and parts be sustained? Who would assume 
the intellectual role James had played in maintaining the balance of 
the whole and parts in American society? It could be John Dewey and 
Walter Lippmann during the first half of the 20th century.
As the representative intellectuals of an era, Dewey and Lippmann 
indeed had their social responsibilities. The world lying ahead of them 
was much bigger, much more pluralistic, and much more realistic 
than what James had experienced. For them democracy and elitism 
were neither any abstract conceptions nor any metaphysical ones, but 
practical and realistic subjects.
It is commonly said that Dewey and Lippmann stood in opposite 
directions in recognizing American democracy. In fact, whereas the 
former believed that American democracy could be completed through, 
and had contributed to, the self-realization of all individuals, the 
latter believed that it could hardly be done through them. Yet their 
standpoints of democracy were not in contrast to each other as they 
both sought in democratic society the unity and harmony of parts and 
the whole through their own respective ways.
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For Dewey, democracy, as Westbrook points out, was “a way of life,”44) but 
not an abstract or theoretical idea. Dewey thought that his pragmatism 
emphasizing the instrumental aspects of ideas and the scientific method 
for them would make it possible so that American individuals would 
actualize fully their potential in society because he regarded such a 
method as being practical, pragmatic, and democratic for all of them. 
As a vast current joining the stream of American intellectual 
history, actually, Dewey’s philosophical thought not only reflected the 
ideals of American democracy-from Puritanism through the Enlightenment 
to American Transcendentalism-but did much to create the intellectual 
foundations of twentieth-century liberal democracy in the United States. 
Dewey's understanding of the unity of human existence applied to his 
understanding of all things, including art, education, society, the 
nation, and the universe. In understanding history and society, 
although he emphasized tradition less than change, his thought was 
based upon the concept of the continuity of time. Thus, the characteristics 
of his thought were constructive, progressive, and developmental. 
Dewey’s whole thought was epitomized in his statement: “We can get 
a better idea of the unity of the human being as we know more about 
all these processes and the way they work together, as they check 
and stimulate one another and bring about a balance.”45) 
Actually, Dewey’s philosophical thought was made in the age of 
Darwin, a time of disruptive intellectual and spiritual change. For 
Dewey, however, the discrepancies and contingencies of the universe, 
44) Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), x.
45) John Dewey, “The Unity of the Human Being,” in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., 
John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925-1953 (17 vols., Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1981), 326.
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which he perceived under the influence of Darwinism, should not provoke 
anxiety, meaninglessness, and despair. He believed that the democratic 
spirit and animating scientific method would provide a new basis for 
authority. He encouraged Americans to act and look forward with 
hope. His scientifically oriented and publicly oriented philosophy tried 
not to segregate the whole from the parts, but to integrate them as 
one. He sought a unity in harmony with other people and with the 
larger, all-inclusive whole. He tried, as much as Edwards did, to find 
the unity and wholeness of life.46)
In his short paper, entitled “Creative Democracy－The Task before 
Us,” John Dewey at the age of eighty, arguing that what the United 
States “committed itself when the nation took shape” was “the creation 
of democracy,” emphasized that “there was in existence a group of 
men who were capable of readapting older institutions and ideas to 
meet the situations provided by new physical conditions－a group of 
men extraordinarily gifted in political inventiveness.” From this statement, 
he seems to have believed that American democracy began to develop 
by some elites with inventive spirit and creative activity. Yet, he still 
had his conviction that “every human being, independent of the 
quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to equal 
opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts 
he has.”47) As Dewey’s understanding of democracy and elitism shows, 
the two concepts have not been mutually exclusive ideas in the 
mainstream American intellectual tradition.
Like Dewey, Walter Lippmann, who recognized well the prevailing 
46) Paul K. Conkin, Puritans and Pragmatists: Eight Eminent American Thinkers 
(New York: Dodd, Mead &Company, 1968), 345.
47) John Dewey, “Creative Democracy--The Task Before Us,” in The Later Works, 
XIV, 229-230.
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pluralistic state of his day, sought a new meaning of democracy and 
a new role for politics. Believing that “democracy” ought to be “more 
than the absence of czars, more than freedom, more than equal opportunity,”48) 
Lippmann thought the coming “battle” would have much to do with 
“the weaknesses of democracy.”49) 
If so, how could they be made up for? Like Dewey, Lippmann also 
looked to science for a better democracy. Lippmann regarded science 
as the concrete fruit of man’s growing self-consciousness and assumed 
that twentieth-century democracy was bound up with the progress of 
the scientific spirit. Yet he realized that the spirit was both a very 
human thing and a very critical thing because he believed that, as 
the isolation of society thanks to social progress ended and it became 
pluralistic, complex, and modern, the image of democracy also became 
complex. To some extent, he was pessimistic, recognizing eventually 
that it was impossible to establish a true, complete democracy. Yet he 
never fell into despair and nihilism. By recognizing clearly the complexities 
and pluralistic elements of reality, he could present more desirable, 
potential, and mature alternatives to the corrosions and dislocations 
of modern American society and its political system. In this respect, 
an understanding of Lippmann’s attitude to the modern age might 
throw light on the problems of Postmodernism facing the United States 
and the world today.
Postmodernists are not the first to recognize the complexities and 
pluralistic elements of political reality. In Public Opinion (1922) and 
The Phantom Public (1925), Lippmann had already dealt with that.50) 
48) Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current 
Unrest (1914; reprint, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 16.
49) Ibid., 17.
50) See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922; reprint, New York: Free Press, 
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“Now in any society that is not completely self-contained in its 
interests and so small that everyone can know all about everything 
that happens,” Lippmann argued, “ideas deal with events that are out 
of sight and hard to grasp.”51) Thus, human behavior was a response 
to a pseudo-environment, necessarily inserted between human beings 
and their environment. Yet “because it is behavior, the consequences, 
if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where the 
behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action 
eventuates.” In modern society, therefore, “what is called the adjustment 
of man to his environment takes place through the medium of fictions.”52)
Lippmann’s recognition of the pseudo-environment was very similar 
to contemporary Postmodernists’ recognition of self and reality. But 
unlike them, Lippmann believed that “fictions” were not necessarily 
lies. Rather, they were “a representation of the environment which is 
in lesser or greater degree made by man himself,” so that “a work of 
fiction may have almost any degree of fidelity, and so long as the 
degree of fidelity can be taken into account, fiction is not misleading.”53) 
Although Lippmann recognized that human culture is very largely the 
selection, the rearrangement, the tracing of patterns upon, and the 
stylizing of fictions, he sought not to deconstruct but to find a real, 
purposeful alternative.
Indeed, when the actual environment became too big, too complex, 
and too fleeting for direct acquaintance, it was “refreshing ... to see 
at times with a perfectly innocent eye ...”54) But innocence itself was 
1949). Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public: A Sequel to “Public Opinion” 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1927).
51) Lippmann, Public Opinion, 8.
52) Ibid., 10.
53) Ibid., 10.
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not wisdom. Rather, a clear recognition of the real complexity of 
environment indicated the clear directions for how we accept the past, 
understand the present, and predict the future. 
That same recognition presents a clue to Lippmann’s inquiry into 
democracy. His concept of modern democracy started from his recognition 
that “the world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, 
out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, and 
imagined.”55) In democratic society, the citizen “is learning to see 
with his mind vast portions of the world that he could never see, 
touch, smell, hear, or remember. Gradually, he makes for himself a 
trustworthy picture inside his head of the world beyond his reach.”56) 
Although such “seeing” determined effort, feeling, and hope, the citizen 
could not determine accomplishment and result. 
For Lippmann, public opinion was “in intermittent contact with 
complexes of all sorts,” and the environment with which public opinion 
dealt was “refracted in many ways, by censorship and privacy at the 
source, by physical and social barriers at the other end, by scanty 
attention, by the poverty of language, by distraction, by unconscious 
constellations of feeling, by wear and tear, violence, monotony.”57) 
Lippmann no longer trusted the validity of a liberal democracy based 
on the expressions of popular will. Yet, unlike Postmodernists, he was 
not a decomposer of society but a constructor. In accepting his new 
view of reality and in realizing its implications for society, he deepened 
and matured his social thought.




57) Ibid., 48, 49.
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it, Lippmann distrusted the public’s ability to understand objective 
representations of reality but did not give up on liberal democracy. 
He was skeptical and pessimistic about modern democracy but wished 
to preserve liberal democracy through the vitality of representative 
governments. He distrusted the expressions of popular will, yet 
throughout his entire career he wrote of public opinion.
Certainly, the basis of democracy must be the actual interests of 
human nature; if democracy did not satisfy those interests, it was an 
empty thing. Indeed, democracy was not established necessarily by 
high, noble, and good human will. As Lippmann noted, “there is no 
prospect, in any time which we can conceive, that the whole invisible 
environment will be so clear to all men that they will spontaneously 
arrive at sound public opinions on the whole business of government.” 
Therefore, “the only prospect which is not visionary is that each of 
us in his own sphere will act more and more on a realistic picture of 
the invisible world, and that we shall develop more and more men 
who are expert in keeping these pictures realistic.”58) Thus Lippmann’s 
democracy “should express the true possibilities of its subject. When 
it does not, it perverts the true possibilities.”59)
Conclusion
As we have seen, mainstream American intellectuals, such as Edwards, 
Emerson, James, and Lippmann, had never tried to see their society 
through a dichotomy between governing elites and the masses. For 
58) Ibid., 197.
59) Lippmann, The Phantom Public, 39.
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them their society was not an entity based on the definite separation 
between rulers and ruled because they understood reality and society 
with the view that the whole and parts should be, and would be, 
harmonized, even though they began to realize that to make a harmony 
and balance among men is always impossible in any society. It was 
not until 1956 when Power Elite by C. Wright Mills appeared that 
American intellectuals began to analyze governing elites and the masses 
as the two basic classes in the American social structure. For Mills, 
who was influenced not by Edward, Emerson, or James but by the elitist 
thinkers such as Pareto, Mosca, and Marx, harmonizing the whole and 
the parts of society must have been just an illusion.
Yet social problems become apparent when the relationship of the 
whole to its parts is out of harmony and trembles in the balance, and 
the status of authority to bridge the whole and parts is undermined. 
In the light of the American intellectual tradition stressing mutual 
consent between the whole and its parts, the postmodernism of our 
days, based on the ideal of the omnicompetent, sovereign citizen, has 
been sustained on a false assumption. Such an ideal is unattainable 
and its pursuit misleading. A realistic alternative to a pluralistic world 
would depend upon a more scientific, more rational, and more democratic 
mind by which the whole-part relation would be rationally and fairly 
maintained by recognizing both the possibilities of individuals and the 
limitations of society as a whole, rather than by God-like abilities 
and functions.
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Abstract
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American Intellectual History
Hyung-dae Lee
(University of Maryland University College, Asia)
This article examines how American intellectuals such as Jonathan Edwards, 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, John Dewey, and Walter Lippmann have 
recognized reality as well as human nature through both experiential and 
transcendental approaches. Understanding their recognitions of reality and man, 
this article argues that throughout American intellectual history the antithesis 
of the concept of democracy had been not necessarily that of elitism, for both 
concepts, rather, had been needed in reaching equilibrium between whole and parts 
which American intellectuals had sought as the most desirable state in the relation 
of man and God, and of individual and society. In fact, even when they stressed 
the excellence of whole and the heroism of man, they did so considering their 
relationships of mutual consent between all parts. In this respect, they were not 
elitist thinkers like Pareto, Mosca, and Michels who established a systematic 
distinction between elite and masses in society and politics. They believed that 
the theological and philosophical concepts of democracy and elitism can be, and 
should be, reconciled and applied for the full growth of individuals and the entire 
progress of society. The aim of this article is to criticize a current intellectual 
ethos which denies reality as well as human subject due to the belief that the 
processes of historical formation have been dominated by elite persons, elite 
values, and elite culture.
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